The employment distribution and the creation of financial dependence by Jackson, W A
This is a repository copy of The employment distribution and the creation of financial 
dependence.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148711/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Jackson, W A orcid.org/0000-0001-5194-7307 (1992) The employment distribution and the
creation of financial dependence. Journal of post keynesian economics. pp. 267-280. ISSN
0160-3477 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.1991.11489897
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
  
 
 
 
THE EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION AND  
 
THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE 
 
 
 
William A. Jackson 
 
 
Department of Economics and Related Studies, 
University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK 
 
Email:  william.jackson@york.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A fall in national income has varied consequences for the working population: 
some carry on working as normal, others become unemployed.  Those excluded 
from work lose their main income source and must usually rely on public 
welfare, entering a financial dependence created endogenously as the economy 
adjusts.  The current paper examines this induced financial dependence and its 
implications within a Post Keynesian model.  A skewed employment 
distribution forces higher transfer payments than would occur if employment 
was distributed more evenly.  The additional expenditures help to sustain 
profitability, so it is in the collective interest of employers and profit recipients 
to concentrate unemployment in a subset of the working population. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite its image as an aggregative approach, Keynesian economics in all its versions 
requires partial disaggregation.  The conventional textbook version disaggregates 
expenditures by type, into consumption, investment, and so forth, but treats income as an 
aggregate.  Post Keynesian versions extend disaggregation to the income side of the model 
and highlight in particular the factor distribution of income.  Following Kalecki (1971), 
factor shares are assumed to be stable in the face of economic fluctuations; saving occurs 
chiefly from profit incomes, so the income distribution is a key influence on aggregate 
expenditure, an influence that is strengthened if investment is financed from past profits.  
The income distribution is thus central to Post Keynesian theory.   
 
    While it is important, the factor distribution of income does not exhaust the distributional 
content of macroeconomics.  Movements in national income are closely tied to a changing 
distribution of wage incomes among the working population.  In a recession, the employed 
continue to work at the same job for the same pay and experience little hardship; the 
unemployed, by contrast, often face a complete loss of wage income and become a 
'null-income' group (Weintraub, 1985).  Incomes are not reduced in equal proportion, and 
the brunt of the reduction is borne by a minority of the working population.  This state of 
affairs is only too apparent from casual observation, yet it is frequently obscured in 
macroeconomic discussion. 
 
    A null-income group arises from two distributional characteristics of capitalist 
economies.  The first is the skewed employment distribution, which concentrates working 
hours among full-time employees and leaves part of the working population without work.  
'Unemployment' in common usage means 'joblessness', a condition that stems from the 
employment distribution.  The second characteristic is the expenditure from non-income 
sources necessary for people without formal incomes to subsist.  If the unemployed have 
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access to past savings, borrowing, gifts or charity, then their expenditures can be financed 
privately.  In practice, the expenditures of the unemployed are financed mainly by 
unemployment or social security benefits, and an unemployed person becomes financially 
dependent on the state.  Neither the skewed employment distribution nor the financial 
dependence of the unemployed is a purely income-based characteristic: they rely more 
especially on the expenditure and employment distributions.  Mainstream macroeconomics 
plays down all aspects of distribution and subsumes them under 'behavioural' relations.  
Even Post Keynesian economics tends to focus on the income distribution, to the detriment 
of the expenditure and employment dimensions. 
 
    The following discussion considers the interrelationship of the employment distribution 
and the financial dependence of the unemployed in a simple Post Keynesian model.  It is 
argued that a skewed employment distribution assists the realisation and stability of profits 
by eliciting a higher general level of transfer payments and expenditures from non-income 
sources.  The wedge driven between the income and expenditure distributions benefits 
profit recipients, but is scant compensation to the jobless for the loss of all employment 
income.  Financial dependence is a symptom of some sectional interests outweighing 
others.  Introducing it into Post Keynesian modelling shows the relevance of sectional 
interests for macroeconomics, an issue absent from mainstream theory and 
underemphasised in Post Keynesian economics. 
 
 
 
A Post Keynesian model with financial dependence 
 
The model takes a standard Post Keynesian form in which income is disaggregated by 
factor shares and national income adjustment is related to employment.  Interest centres on 
the incidence of financial dependence, modelled explicitly by depicting transfer payments 
and hours of work.   
  
- 3 - 
 
    The income side of the model is: 
 
                                     Y  =   VHE  =     1     WHE 
                                                            (1-k) 
 
where Y = total income; E = employment; V = average value added per hour of work; H = 
average working hours per employee per period; k = share of non-wage incomes in total 
income; and W = (1-k)V = average hourly wage. 
 
    V, k, W and h are assumed to be constant in the period considered, as are relative prices.  
V can change through variable intensity of work, a possibility recognised in 
non-neoclassical theory (Hodgson, 1982) and compatible with Post Keynesian modelling 
(Jackson, 1990), but in the present model variation in productivity per employee will be 
limited to working hours H, so as to single out the distribution of working time.  H is 
initially assumed constant, and Y varies proportionally with E, a requirement dropped in the 
next section.  The constant k can be seen as encapsulating Kalecki's degree of monopoly, or 
alternatively as an empirical stylised fact.  The average hourly wage W stays constant. 
 
    The expenditure side of the model is: 
 
(1)          X  =  C + I + G 
                   = [bw(1-tw)(1-k) + bp(1-tp)k]VHE + bw[F+r(1-k)VH(L-E)] + I + G 
                   = bw(F + rWHL) + [bw(1-tw-r)(1-k) + bp(1-tp)k]VHE + I + G 
 
where X = total expenditure; L = working population; tw = taxes on wage income; tp = taxes 
on non-wage income; bw = propensity to consume out of wage and transfer incomes; bp = 
propensity to consume out of non-wage income; r = average replacement ratio (proportion 
of gross wage income replaced by unemployment benefits); F = fixed transfer payments; 
I = investment; and G = government expenditure. 
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    L and F are assumed to be constant in the period considered, and tw, tp, bw, bp, and r are 
all constant coefficients between zero and unity.  The L-E unemployed receive benefits of 
rWH, where r is the replacement ratio from gross wage income.   Other sources of 
expenditure by the unemployed are assumed to be negligible.  All other transfer payments 
are incorporated into the fixed component (F), and the propensity to consume out of 
transfer payments is the same as that out of wage income.  Assuming a closed economy, the 
only other expenditures are investment (I) and government spending on goods and 
services (G). 
 
    In a steady state, Y is equated with X through changes in national income and 
employment.  Setting Y = X and rearranging yields: 
 
 
(2)           Y  =      bw(F + rWHL) + I + G                    E  =    Y 
                             1 - bw(1-tw-r)(1-k) - bp(1-tp)k                        VH 
 
 
    Figure 1 illustrates the outcome.  The income curve has slope VH; the expenditure curve 
has an intercept bw(F + rWHL) + I + G, and a slope [bw(1-tw-r)(1-k) + bp(1-tp)k]VH.  The 
diagram resembles the aggregate supply and demand analysis of Weintraub (1956, 1957), 
expressed in a linearised, 'Kaleckian' form; instead of aggregate supply and demand, an 
income-expenditure terminology has been adopted (as, for example, in Nell, 1988).  
Autonomous expenditure changes have the usual comparative static properties, the value of 
the multiplier determined by the denominator of equation (2).  Since financial dependence 
is the consequence of unemployment, the size of the financially dependent population is 
endogenous to the model, and countercyclical. 
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Figure 1   Steady states with different replacement ratios  
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    A rise in the replacement ratio ± other things being equal ± decreases the slope of the 
expenditure function and increases expenditures at low national income levels.  On 
Figure 1, a rise in r to r' rotates the expenditure curve clockwise about its intersection with 
the full employment vertical.  As one would expect, a higher replacement ratio is 
expansionary, increasing employment from E to E' if other expenditures are constant.  The 
effect of r on employment is circumscribed by the deflationary gap at L, such that even if r 
rises to unity (making the X curve horizontal), employment can reach only an upper limit of 
E+.  A high replacement ratio is also an automatic stabiliser, which dampens economic 
fluctuations by reducing the slope of the X curve and, thus, the multiplier. 
 
    A further property of a high replacement ratio is that it can ease the realisation of profit 
incomes.  For a constant k, the expansionary effect of higher unemployment benefits helps 
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to sustain national income and aggregate profits.  If k varies, then higher unemployment 
benefits relax the tension between the share of non-wage incomes (k), and the realisation of 
profit.  Suppose that k changes, with V constant, implying shifts in W (= (1-k)V) and r, if 
unemployment benefits are fixed at B =  r(1-k)VH.  Under these assumptions, Y/k =          
- Y[bw(1-tw)-bp(1-tp)]/D, where D is the denominator of equation (2), and a higher k is 
deflationary if bw(1-tw) > bp(1-tp), as should generally hold true.  Any rise in k is offset by 
downward pressure on national income, a 'contradictory' feature of the capitalist economy 
(Steindl, 1952; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Cowling, 1982).  The interaction between B and 
Y/k is given by: 
 
                       Y     =    bw [bw(1-tw)-bp(1-tp)] (2E-L)     0    as     E    L-E 
                     kB         D2 
 
assuming bw(1-tw) > bp(1-tp).  A higher value of B alleviates the deflationary effect of a 
higher k, provided that employment exceeds unemployment, as usually applies.  In this 
respect, high unemployment benefits are to the advantage of profit recipients, facilitating 
the realisation of profits through the uncoordinated attempts by individual employers to 
raise k.  Contrary to microeconomic, incentive-based arguments, from a macroeconomic 
perspective a high replacement ratio is conducive to the operation of capitalist economies ± 
a view that is confirmed by consideration of the employment distribution. 
 
 
 
The employment distribution 
 
Reductions in aggregate employment are accomplished largely by redundancies, which 
bring the loss of all working time for some employees but leave others unaffected.  The 
difference in experience underlies the income distribution of the working population and is 
the major short-run cause of distributional changes.  Employment patterns create an 
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inequality that would be difficult to defend if employment were to be a legitimate target for 
redistribution.  In neoclassical terms, for example, a utilitarian allocation of employment 
would be very unlikely, under standard assumptions, to give a corner solution where part of 
the labour force is jobless.  Whether desirable or not, however, a skewed employment 
distribution predominates in capitalist economies. 
 
    Different kinds of employment adjustment can be included straightforwardly in the 
model in the previous section.  Average wage income per worker per period is WH, which 
may be expressed (1-k)VH.  In the previous section, V, k and H were constant, and income 
changes occurred through variations in E.  Suppose now that while V and k are still 
approximately constant in the short run, some variation in H is permitted, and firms no 
longer rely solely on recruitment and layoffs in their employment adjustments.  
Unemployment benefits are fixed at B, so that r =  B/(1-k)VH varies inversely with H.  
Taken in isolation, a reduction in H rotates both the income and the expenditure curves of 
Figure 1 downward about the vertical axis, producing a new intersection with lower Y but 
higher E.  The effect is to reduce national income, but to increase the number of workers 
employed (as opposed to total hours worked).  In practice, if H varies at all, the changes are 
probably associated with movements in autonomous expenditures.  Let investment rise 
from I to I'; with E and H both variable, the expansion can be accommodated either by 
higher E, higher H, or some combination of the two.  The possible income and employment 
outcomes are obtained by solving the equations of (2) (at I =  I') for Y' and E', such that: 
 
(3)                       Y'   =    bw(F + BL) + I' + G - bwBE' 
          
                                              1 - bw(1-tw)(1-k) - bp(1-tp)k 
 
where E'  E, H'  H are assumed to apply.  There is a negative linear relation between the 
possible Y' and E' values, bounded by the extremes of holding E or H constant.  The 
income-expenditure diagram is presented in Figure 2.  In this diagram, the line segment RS 
is the set of possible outcomes.  Adjustment by longer working hours alone, raising H to +֥, 
causes a vertical movement from Q to R, with no change in E and the largest possible 
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increase in Y.  Conversely, adjustment by recruitment alone, raising E to (֥, causes a shift 
along the income curve from Q to S, with a lower increase in Y, and the largest possible 
increase in E.  Between these extremes, any point on RS can emerge, depending on how the 
higher total working hours are attained: the more adjustment that takes place through 
recruitment, the closer is the end point to S. 
 
 
Figure 2   Steady states with different kinds of employment adjustment 
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     The multiplier process occurs within the triangle QRS and permits many alternative 
ways of reaching the same end point on RS.  Consider the enlarged area QRS shown in 
Figure 3.  Į ȕ DQG Ȗ are three alternative paths from a common starting point, Q, to a 
common end point, T.  For all three paths, the income multiplier is the same, equal to the 
change in income divided by the change in investment, that is, QY'/Qa.  The income 
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multiplier depends only on the position of T on RS; it has a higher value if T is closer to R.  
To identify the employment multiplier requires knowledge of the adjustment path within 
QRS.  On path Į, the initial investment expansion Qa (= I'-I) results mainly in longer 
working hours, with recruitment of only Qb and an employment multiplier QE'/Qb > 
QY'/Qa, such that later expenditure rounds have a relatively greater employment impact.  
Path ȕ is the opposite of Į: the initial expansion goes mainly into higher employment of Qd 
and later expenditures into longer hours, yielding an employment multiplier QE'/Qd < 
QY'/Qa.  On the linear path Ȗ, income and employment increase in the same proportion, and 
the multipliers coincide at QE'/Qc = QY'/Qa.  Generally, the employment multiplier is 
larger when the adjustment path is concave, the income multiplier when the adjustment 
path is convex, and the multipliers are identical along a linear path. 
 
 
 
Figure 3   Alternative adjustment paths 
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    Movements in H and E have differing distributional consequences.  Movements in H 
reduce the variability of E, but increase the variability of Y and aggregate non-wage 
incomes kY (for constant k).  It is in the collective interests of profit recipients for working 
time to vary through layoffs and recruitment, as a means of stabilising profits.  For the 
working population, the position is more ambiguous and divisive: those who remain 
employed are better off with recruitment and layoffs; those who become unemployed are 
the losers and bear the costs of joblessness.  The crux is the financial dependence of the 
unemployed.  If unemployment benefits, B, are set to zero, then Y' in equation (3) is 
independent of E', and the line segment RS in Figure 2 is horizontal.  In that case, the 
change in aggregate profits is the same, regardless of the method of adjusting working time.  
In reality, the expenditures of the unemployed cannot be zero if they are to subsist, and 
without state benefits they would have to find alternative non-income sources of 
expenditure (borrowing, gifts, charity, etc.).  By denying all employment income to some 
individuals and forcing their spending to be financed from other sources, the imposition of 
recruitment and layoffs ensures greater stability of national income and aggregate profits. 
 
    Along with stability, the level of profits is also of concern to employers.  In the present 
model, a higher H ± other things being equal ± raises national income and aggregate profits 
so that employers stand to gain directly from long working hours coupled with joblessness.  
Employers can best protect profits by behaving asymmetrically, preferring longer hours 
when demand is rising, but layoffs when demand is falling.  In Figure 2, demand is then 
slanted toward higher working hours, near to line segment RQ, and contraction is slanted 
toward redundancies, near to line segment OQ.  The economy is pushed in a north-westerly 
direction, toward an upper limit to working hours, governed by the physical capacity to 
work or by social norms or legislation specifying an acceptable working week.  Once an 
upper limit has been reached, the pressures for firms to concentrate employment will not be 
manifested in asymmetric employment adjustment, but in the skewness of the employment 
distribution, with normal, full-time working hours and unemployment.  These 
macroeconomic considerations supplement the traditional Marxian view that chronic 
unemployment and surplus labour divide the working population, enhancing the bargaining 
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power of employers and their control over the conditions of production.  On both 
macroeconomic and bargaining grounds, employers have good reason to preserve 
joblessness as the main employment regulator. 
 
    The above observations broach the question of structurally determined behaviour.  The 
structure of a capitalist economy is such that private employers can influence the 
employment distribution and the extent of financial dependence; they also benefit from 
financial dependence, through its consequences for profit realisation and control of 
production.  It is a short step to argue further that structure causes the behaviour of 
employers.  The outcome is, in sociological parlance, a structural-functional interpretation 
of the economy, although the economic system is here functioning to promote sectional 
interests (employers/profit recipients and the job-secure) at the expense of those who are 
vulnerable to unemployment.  One would not wish to press functionalism too far, however, 
given that employers are not in general conscious of the macroeconomic effects of their 
actions.  It suffices to note that the normal functioning of capitalist economies favours some 
sectional interests before others ± an observation missing from mainstream theory because 
of its individualistic basis.  The place of individualism in macroeconomics merits further 
consideration. 
 
 
 
Financial dependence and individualism 
 
Although macroeconomics is often said to lack microeconomic foundations, the usual 
textbook version of macroeconomics is based squarely on individual behaviour.  Invoking 
Keynes's 'psychological law', the aggregate consumption function is constructed as an 
enlarged version of what is thought to be reasonable behaviour for consumers experiencing 
income variation.  The macroeconomic relation is no different in essence from the 
individual relations, a macrocosm to their microcosm.  Such a view may diverge from 
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neoclassical theory in its adoption of an ad-hoc behavioural rule, but it remains 
microeconomic in its appeal to individual behaviour.  To attempt to base macroeconomics 
on individual choice detracts from the importance of distribution and employment in 
national income determination, as well as encouraging the addition of further neoclassical 
elements. 
 
    Part of the responsibility for an individualistic method lies with Keynes.  In the earliest 
Keynesian writings, the expansionary effects of public expenditure are described in terms 
of new recruitment and movement of people from the dole into employment (Keynes and 
Henderson, 1929; Keynes, 1933).  The same link between employment and expenditures is 
also evident in the original formulation of the multiplier (Kahn, 1931).  Translated into an 
income-expenditure analysis, this implies what would now be called a Post Keynesian 
framework, on the lines of the second section of this paper, where the consumption function 
is built upon movements of people from unemployment into employment.  Unfortunately, 
when Keynes formalises the theory (Keynes, 1936), he draws the analogy with individual 
behaviour in deriving the aggregate consumption function and masks the contribution of 
employment changes.  Under Keynes's assumptions, the consumption function would have 
its usual shape even if there were an equiproportional change in incomes during 
macroeconomic adjustments, so there is no need to refer to the highly unequal changes that 
actually take place.  Keynes was aware of the connection between macroeconomics and 
distribution and alludes to it several times in the General Theory.  At one point (p. 90), he 
comments that the consumption function should really be based on employment, but he 
does not pursue this further, on the supposition that the distribution of employment is 
related systematically to national income.  With a stable relation between income and 
employment, Keynes uses income as a proxy for employment in the consumption function, 
directing attention away from the non-income expenditures of the unemployed.  In 
Keynes's formulation, distributional changes are implicit, and macroeconomics never 
openly addresses the subject of distribution. 
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    When Keynesian economics was developed into the neoclassical synthesis, the 
individualistic bias was retained and consolidated.  The emphasis on individual behaviour 
is exemplified by the standard theoretical treatments of the long-run consumption function, 
believed empirically to have a smaller intercept and greater slope than short-run or 
cross-section versions.  Two main explanations are put forward: the 'life-cycle hypothesis' 
(Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954), and the 'permanent income hypothesis' (Friedman, 
1957).  Both are individualistic, personal consumption depending on a long-run income 
concept that varies little in the short run.  The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 
therefore lower for short-run or cross-section data.  This may well be true, but behavioural 
differences are not strictly necessary to explain the apparent empirical discrepancy.  More 
recent empirical evidence has cast doubt on the presence of behavioural differences.  
Bunting (1989), for instance, has shown that much of the discrepancy between long-run and 
cross-section estimates can be ascribed to different units of comparison.  Long-run 
estimates have been calculated from aggregate data, without allowing for changes in the 
size and number of households.  When the data are converted to a common household unit, 
the long-run and cross-section estimates turn out to be similar, and the consumption 
function 'paradox' disappears. 
 
    For aggregate consumption functions, a difference between long run and short run may 
ensue from the greater significance of structural change in the long run.  As an illustration, 
consider equation (1).  In the short run, income variation occurs through employment, E, 
and relating C to Y, this gives a consumption function, C = ȡ + ıY, where ȡ =  bw(F+rWHL) 
and ı = bw(1-tw-r)(1-k)+bp(1-tp)k.  Suppose now that long-run economic change is 
dominated by movements in productivity (V), working hours (H) and the working 
population (L), representing technical, social and demographic change.  Let unemployment 
remain at a long-run average level, with E = ȜL (Ȝ constant 0 < Ȝ < 1), while fixed transfer 
payments rise in proportion to national income, with F =  ȝY (ȝ constant).  All other 
parameters (bw, bp, k, r, tw, tp) are assumed to be approximately constant, and there are no 
behavioural differences between time periods.  Noting that Y = ȜVHL, the long-run 
consumption function can be written as C = (ı + Ĳ)Y, where Ĳ = bw[ȝ + r(1-k)/Ȝ].  Since 
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ı + Ĳ > ı, the long-run function has a greater slope than the short-run function, and passes 
through the origin.  The zero intercept derives from transfer payments and financial 
dependence, which vary positively with income in the long run, but negatively in the short 
run.  Without appealing to differences in the individual MPC, the model can yield the 
conventional empirical findings merely by distinguishing long-run from short-run 
economic change.  The role of individual behaviour has been exaggerated in the 
mainstream economic literature (Green, 1984).  An aggregate consumption function is 
more than just a magnification of individual behaviour: it also reflects the sources and 
distribution of expenditures during the period considered. 
 
    The distributional change entailed in macroeconomic adjustments prevents the 
construction of macroeconomic models from 'typical' individual behaviour.  Mainstream 
macroeconomics nevertheless eschews distribution and expresses itself in income terms, 
scarcely mentioning the financial dependence of null-income groups.  An extreme is 
reached in the reversion to neoclassical macroeconomics, where individual behaviour 
mediated by markets is paramount and involuntary unemployment ceases to exist.  Such a 
view lacks any notion of financial dependence as a socially created state.  The same attitude 
is apparent in economic discussions of other examples of financial dependence, notably 
retired state pensioners.  A choice-theoretic approach to the elderly concentrates on the 
retirement and saving decisions of individuals, modelled as rational life-cycle planning 
blown up to an economy-wide scale (a literature reviewed in Clark and Spengler, 1980).  
Empirically, the status of life-cycle planning is open to question (Danziger et al., 1982; 
Wiseman, 1989), but it persists as the core vision of long-run economic behaviour in 
mainstream theory.  The representation of retirement as a socially created state has been 
due largely to authors in social policy and sociology who are more willing to take a 
non-individualistic stance (examples are Townsend, 1981; Walker, 1981; Hendricks and 
McAllister, 1983).  As with unemployment, retirement then becomes a form of 
redistribution, which has little to do with individual career planning and is difficult to 
regard solely in this light even if one were so inclined.  Although of lesser short-run impact 
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than employment practices, retirement policies are highly pertinent to macroeconomic 
discussion, a further case of the creation of financial dependence. 
 
    Macroeconomics is not inherently a matter of aggregation, but of depicting the economy 
as a whole.  While society is composed of individuals, it has its own structure contingent on 
time and place.  Individuals can influence social structure, but social structure also 
influences the individual.  An insistence on individualistic, choice-theoretic foundations for 
macroeconomics means that social structure appears, if at all, only as exogenous constraints 
on individual decisions that should, in principle, be reduced to individual behaviour.  The 
addition of constraints to neoclassical theory is termed 'imperfectionism' by Milgate and 
Eatwell (1982), because of its implication that removing the constraints would restore the 
neoclassical ideal of perfect competition.  Imperfectionism at least concedes a possible 
place for institutions, albeit begrudgingly and apologetically, with an air of failure that they 
are not 'explained' by rational individual behaviour.  The shift away from strict 
neoclassicism is in the right direction, but does not go far enough.  Instead of grafting 
institutional constraints on to a neoclassical model, it is better to start out immediately by 
rejecting an individualistic method (Hodgson, 1986) and basing macroeconomic modelling 
candidly on a specific social and economic structure.  Any truly macroeconomic theory has 
to be institutional, a fact barely acknowledged by mainstream macroeconomics, yet 
fundamental. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A skewed employment distribution and financial dependence on the state are twin, 
interrelated distributional characteristics of capitalist economies.  The regulation of 
employment by joblessness creates a null-income group whose expenditures must come 
from sources other than private incomes: the state now provides transfer payments to the 
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unemployed which would not necessarily be forthcoming if employment were distributed 
more equally.  From a Post Keynesian perspective, full-time employment and a high 
incidence of financial dependence on the state are beneficial to employers: they stabilise 
aggregate income, ease the realisation of profits, and weaken the bargaining position of 
workers.  The resulting institutionalised pattern of full-time employment is to the collective 
advantage of employers, profit recipients and the job-secure. 
 
    The importance of distribution is well appreciated in Post Keynesian economics, but the 
stress is often on the income distribution, rather than on the distributions of expenditure and 
employment.  The stress on incomes, a vestigial neoclassical trait, prompts a neglect of 
financially dependent groups excluded from the national income accounts.  A 
macroeconomics without financial dependence is in tune with neoclassicism, which aspires 
to individualistic explanations, and keeps quiet about social power and sectional interests.  
It is out of tune with Post Keynesian and non-neoclassical economics, which have no such 
commitment to individualistic foundations.  Financial dependence is a prime example of a 
socially induced state, and its prevalence is a reminder of the social and institutional nature 
of macroeconomics. 
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